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I
"Great cases like hard cases," perhaps, still "make bad law," I but
in the Supreme Court of the United States they often make almost no
law at all. The Court divides sharply and even splinters; a majority is
obtained for the judgment only on the narrowest grounds, and the
result is explained and justified only in a most cryptic opinion. Indi-
vidual Justices, more expansive in explaining their concurrence, justify
it on grounds that do not commend themselves to their brethren and
that would hardly govern any other case. And that which makes the
case great or hard renders unlikely that another case will soon arise to
invoke the Court's "precedent."
By any criteria, the case of the Pentagon Papers 2 must be deemed
great or hard, or at least dramatic; surely, it represents "some accident
of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and"-
some will add-"distorts the judgment." ' Six Justices concurred in
the judgment, and at least five of them 4 joined a brief per curiam
opinion. Each of the concurring Justices wrote separately, two pairs
joining each other's opinion. Each of the three dissenting Justices
wrote, and all of them joined in one of the dissents. Some things said
by one or more Justices on one side commended themselves to one or
more on the other.
The majority justified its judgment in one brief paragraph:
"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931). The Government "thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."
t Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia Uni-
versity. A.B. 1937, Yeshiva College; LL.B. 1940, Harvard University.
1 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), quoted in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752
(Harlan, J., dissenting), 759 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting) (1971).
2 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
4 Although only justices Stewart and White expressly said so. New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971).
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Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971). The District Court for the Southern District
of New York in the New York Times case and the District
Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Washington Post
case held that the Government had not met that burden. We
agree.-
We know, then, that for a majority of the Court the lower courts
properly denied an injunction in this case. One is entitled to infer also
that, for the majority, the courts must decide in every such case whether
or not the "heavy burden" has been met; if it has, an injunction could
and should issue, the first amendment notwithstanding. We are not
told, however, why the public interests asserted by the United States
were deemed insufficient. Nor are we given general guidance: What
kinds of public interests will be protected against Press publication?
Do different public interests have the same or different weight? Do
the interests of the Press also weigh differently in different cases? How
are weights of interests to be determined? What kinds of evidence
would meet the Government's burden?
Some intimations of the views of particular Justices can be gleaned
from the proliferation of concurring opinions, in the light of their con-
currence in the delphic per curiam. Justices Black and Douglas, though
they joined the Court's opinion, might not approve judicial restraint of
the Press, at least prior restraint, in any circumstances." Justice
Brennan might approve an injunction, even a temporary one, only upon
proof that "publication must inevitably, directly and immediately cause
the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea." ' Justice Marshall, and perhaps Justices Stewart and
White, refused the injunction in part because Congress had not au-
thorized it, indeed because Congress "has specifically declined to pro-
hibit" publication like that in issue; 8 together with the dissenting
Justices, then, they might have formed a majority to approve an in-
junction authorized by statute, in a like case or even in a case in which
the interests jeopardized by publication were less weighty. Justices
White and Stewart (as well as Marshall and the dissenters) would
apparently find in the first amendment far less resistance to prosecution
after publication than to "prior restraint" of publication by injunction;
the former might even be possible in a case in which the governmental
interests asserted were not very weighty.
Students of the Court, of course, hesitate to build doctrine with
what the Court did not do or say, even with the implications of its
5 Id. at 714.
6Od. at 715, 722-23.
• Id. at 726-27.
8 id. at 742.
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reasoning for cases not before it. We may have a few more bricks, or
straws, before long, if persons who have been charged with crime for
making the Pentagon Papers available to the Press are convicted,9 and
if their convictions are reviewed by the Supreme Court. But another
case like last summer's-whether hard or easy, great or small-is not
likely to arise soon, and before that case is enshrined-and forgotten-
it seems useful to penetrate the rhetoric and dispel the confusion it has
engendered, and to plead the fundamental issue.
II
Both before the courts and in the Press there was much talk of
"the right of the people to know" what government was up to. That
phrase might have appealed to the authors of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and even to Constitutional Fathers whose political theory and
rhetoric asserted that sovereignty was in "the people" and that govern-
ment governed with the consent of the governed.' But the Constitu-
tion, of course, expressed no such right, if only because the Eighteenth
Century Framers were committed to minimal, "watch dog" government,
and saw rights as "retained by the people" to be safeguarded against
infringement by government; " they did not declare obligations by the
government to the people or declare rights of the people that government
was obliged affirmatively to effectuate. A "right of the people to know"
may indeed have been a principal rationale for the freedom of the
Press, but, in the law at least, the people's right to know was derivative,
the obverse of the right of the Press to publish, and coextensive with it.
The Press apart, however, any right of the people to know was not
considered violated if government maintained secrecy in some matters;
it was assumed, no doubt, that the people agreed it should not know
what could not be told it without damage to the public interest. From
our national beginnings, the Government of the United States has
asserted the right to conceal and, therefore, in practical effect not to let
the people know. Secrecy governed the deliberations in Philadelphia in
1787. Some need for secrecy was expressly recognized in the Con-
stitution: in providing for publication of a journal of each House of
Congress, it excepted "such parts as may in their judgment require
secrecy." 12 The occasional need for secrecy underlay some of the dis-
9 See New York Times, Dec. 31, 1971, at 1, cols. 5-7; id., June 29, 1971, at 1,
col. 5.
10 E.g., VA. CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS §§ 1-3 (1776), in F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONsTrrUTIONS 3812 (1909) (with unimportant changes in punctuation
and wording, now VA. CoNsT., art. 1, §§ 1-3 (1971)).
11 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONS?., amend. IX (1791).
When arguing for adoption of the bill of rights, James Madison said, "[T]he great
object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out
of the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act ... "
1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 437 (1789).
12 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5.
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positions of the Constitution: the power to conduct foreign relations
was given to the Executive rather than to Congress," and a part in
making treaties to the less numerous Senate rather than to the House.'
4
Presidents from Washington to Nixon have asserted "executive priv-
ilege" to withhold information from Congress.'" And Congresses and
congressional committees have recognized the "right," the propriety,
the need for some executive nondisclosure, even to them: since 1791
Congress, in requesting reports from Executive Departments, has asked
the State Department to report only what in the President's judgment
was "not incompatible with the public interest." 16 Modern Congresses
have recognized the Executive's classification system and provided for
its enforcement, to some extent by criminal penalties. 7 The Supreme
Court, too, has repeatedly recognized the need for some secrecy in ex-
ecutive activities.' s For its own part, Congress has often claimed the
need to conceal: the Senate in particular (especially in executive ses-
sion), and committees and subcommittees of both Houses, have often
maintained secrecy. The courts, too, often insist on the confidentiality
of deliberations in the jury room or in judicial chambers. The most
confidential proceeding in all of the government is probably the con-
ference of the Justices of the Supreme Court.
The reasons for confidentiality in government are various. Mili-
tary secrecy in time of war is the example usually cited, but that, and
13 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
14See THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay), No. 75 (A. Hamilton). Compare
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936).
35 See, e.g., 1 3. RICHAR soN, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 194
(1897), cited in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21
(1936). Many instances of presidential refusal are collected in 40 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 45
(1949). See also Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period
1953-1960, 29 GEo. WASH. L. Riv. 623 (1961). See generally, Bishop, The Execu-
tive's Right of Privacy, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957).
16 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936);
40 CONG. REc. 1418 (1906) (remarks of Senator Spooner). While congressional com-
mittees have often resisted the President's claim of privilege, some of them have
recognized it in principle. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1960).
17 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1970), with id. § 797, and id. § 798.
8 E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
See also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Attorney General
claimed the right to refuse to divulge to the courts something relating to his official
transactions while he was acting as Secretary of State. The Court said: "There was
nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there had been he was not obliged
to answer it; and if he thought that anything was communicated to him in confidence
he was not bound to disclose it." Id. at 143-45.
The Government's desire for secrecy may be subject to some limitations, however,
when it is invoked in court. In Reynolds, a civil suit against the United States
arising from the death of three civilians in the crash of a military plane, the Court
said that in the circumstances the Government's privilege against production of the
accident report had been properly invoked. The majority intimated, however, that
if it appeared necessary the trial judge could inspect the documents to determine
whether they were privileged. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the
Court required the Government to make witness reports available to the accused or
drop the prosecution. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Giordano
v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
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defense security in time of peace, do not begin to explain all the in-
formation that government has regularly withheld. Diplomatic com-
munications are commonly restricted. Wilson's "open covenants openly
arrived at" was a notorious if innocent joke, a precept he violated as
soon as he had pronounced it. No one has questioned the need to
prevent premature disclosure of new policy-say, impending economic
acts that might affect prices, rates, or values-where "leaks" might
bring chaos, or unfair advantage to those who learn early. Con-
fidentiality and privilege are recognized as essential to many working
relationships, and many believe that government would become im-
possible if all communications between officials might readily become
public knowledge.19 And does even an official, perhaps, have a right
of "privacy," or a right to have his role fully and accurately, not selec-
tively or erroneously, known?
Government has protected its "right to withhold" by various
devices-by selection of trustworthy personnel, by rules, practices, and
mores of non-divulging, by avoidance of written communication or
other recording, by classifications and restricted distributions, by codes
and ciphers, by locks and guards. Such measures to prevent disclosure
have also been supplemented by criminal statutes to deter it: laws
against espionage have existed longer than the Constitution; some dis-
closures are expressly forbidden; 20 some publications, involving un-
authorized disposition of government documents, might be punishable
under general statutes protecting government property."' In some cir-
cumstances disclosure could bring contempt proceedings by Congress or
by the courts. Unauthorized disclosure by officials might bring sus-
pension or removal.22
In principle as in practice, then, the "right of the people to know"
what Government does has always been reduced by "the right-or duty,
or responsibility--of the Government to withhold" in the public interest.
But governmental secrecy has usually been seen as at best a necessary
evil, and the necessity for that evil has not been accepted by all at all
times in all cases. The standards for determining the need to withhold
are less than exact, and reasonable men differ widely as to them and as
to their application in particular cases. Without any doubt, moreover,
Government frequently withholds more and for longer than it has to.
Officials, of course, tend to resolve doubts in favor of non-disclosure.
Some concealment is improperly motivated-to cover up mistakes, to
promote private or partisan interests, even to deceive another branch or
19 Compare the exceptions in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(1970), for "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."
There are exceptions also for trade secrets and commercial information, personnel,
medical, and similar files, and other matters.
2018 U.S.C. §§793, 794 (1970).
21 See id. § 641.
22 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501, 7532 (1970).
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department of government, or the electorate. Congress has tried to
deal with such abuse, for example, in the Freedom of Information Act,'
but such statutes do not begin to reach the problem of "over-conceal-
ment" by mammoth, complex government. It may be because "over-
concealment" is rampant that Congress seems to have aimed criminal
penalties to enforce classification essentially-perhaps exclusively-at
purposeful disclosure "with intent or reason to believe that it is to be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign
nation." 24
Still, in the past at least, few have seen constitutional issues in
governmental concealment. A government official, surely, has no con-
stitutional "right" to divulge what he learns in office if those in au-
thority prescribe secrecy. A citizen who happens upon a classified
document or information also cannot insist on a right to divulge what
the law forbids him to. Few have believed, moreover, that a govern-
mental classification was not valid unless it was shown to be "necessary,"
that, constitutionally, a defendant could not be punished for unau-
thorized disclosure unless the Government showed that the public
interest required concealment in the particular case. Rather, it has been
assumed, a court would hold that the judgment of the political branches
that withholding was required was within their constitutional au-
thority to make and not for the courts to review.
25
III
Nothing in the Pentagon Papers Case contradicts these assump-
tions for the generality of cases; nothing in it suggests other limitations
on the authority of the Government to withhold information or of
Congress to provide punishment for, or injunction against, divulgence.
The question raised by Pentagon Papers was whether publication by
the Press is different.
Even as to the Press, it should be clear, it has not been claimed
that the Government was constitutionally obliged to tell the Press
everything, or anything. Nor is it widely claimed, apparently, that
Congress could not constitutionally provide criminal penalties or in-
junction against unauthorized disclosure to a newspaper by an indi-
23 Id. § 552. That section does not apply to matters that are "specifically required
by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy," and to a host of other matters. Id. § 552(b).
24 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970). Virtually the same language is employed in id. § 793.
Id. § 798 (a) seems to cast a wider net although how one parses some of the clauses
will doubtless be sharply debated in court. The statute would punish "Whoever
knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes
available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign
government to the detriment of the United States any classified information .... "
Subsection (b) defines "classified information" as information designated for limited
or restricted dissemination or distribution "for reasons of national security." Compare
50 U.S.C. §783(b),(d) (1970) (on the disclosure of classified information by a
Government employee).
25 See note 18 supra.
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vidual, official or citizen, though that would doubtless deter "leaks" to
the Press in general, and effectively deprive it of the information or
document.
Apparently, then, one approaches serious constitutional issues only
when one attempts to enforce governmental secrecy directly against the
Press itself. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press," and there has
been common disposition to apply the amendment to the Executive and
the courts as well.' 0 But the import of the first amendment is as un-
certain and undefined in regard to the freedom of the Press as to the
other rights and freedoms that it protects, and, indeed, the courts have
had far fewer occasions to define the freedom of the Press than, say,
freedom of speech.
Doubtless, the amendment sought to protect the freedom of the
Press to report and to criticize the actions of government. In publish-
ing the Pentagon Papers the Press asserted something more-the right
to publish documents prepared by, belonging to, and emanating from
the Executive Branch that, in the exercise of constitutional responsi-
bility, the Executive sought to withhold. One can argue that the
traditional freedom of the Press is not in issue, and that the Press is
not free to publish confidential government documents with impunity,
even less, say, than it could publish private documents in violation of
a copyright, or disclose protected trade secrets, or invade individual
privacy. But Government has a monopoly of masses of important in-
formation and it could effectively curtail the freedom of the Press to
report and criticize by withholding that information, or distort the
function of the Press by selective "hand out."
Neither the Court's per curiam nor any of the individual opinions
tells us whether it was relevant or material, and whether it made the
Government's burden any lighter, that the papers were, or derived from,
government documents. We are not told whether and how much it
would matter were it determined that they were obtained without the
Government's consent, that they were taken or copied in violation of
some governmental "title" or right. We know only that even as to the
particular documents, so classified, so obtained, so about-to-be-published,
the Government in this case and in these circumstances did not meet its
burden to the satisfaction of the courts.
The Press, then, the Court has told us, is different. At least when
Congress has not spoken, Press publication even of government docu-
ments cannot be enjoined unless the courts "balance" in favor of the
government, and the balances are weighted heavily on the side of free-
dom. For some Justices, perhaps, even criminal penalties would not be
2 6 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143-44 (Black, J.,
concurring), 199 (Reed, J., dissenting) (1951); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 188 (1957) ; West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 386 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (1952);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
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available, surely if the Government had little to put in its balance. For
some, on the other hand, criminal penalties might be imposed, and even
injunctions might issue, if Congress authorized them, perhaps with
little regard to the weight of the governmental interest at stake.
IV
Friends of liberty are warmly disposed to any decision that favors
freedom against authority, even against representative government.
The student of the Constitution requires something more, a work-
able accommodation of competing values properly achieved and reason-
ably justified. Perhaps the Pentagon Papers Case was rightly decided;
perhaps the Court was wise to read the Constitution as requiring wide
berth to anything that looks like censorship, even filtered through the
courts; perhaps the Court was uneasy with subtle distinctions founded
on the source and the character of documents and information. But it has
not drawn acceptable lines. The distinction between prior injunction
and subsequent punishment is hallowed by history, but its application,
at least here, would seem less than persuasive: while a criminal penalty
more readily permits "civil disobedience," or reliance on the jury to
acquit, stiff penalties will deter-and deny the right to know-almost
as effectively as any injunction.
More important, the upshot of the Court's apparent constitutional
doctrine is unsatisfying. For, as regards governmental documents and
information, the Constitution is apparently interpreted as ordaining that
a branch of government can properly conceal, even from other branches,
surely from the public; but the Press is free to try to uncover, and if it
succeeds it is free to publish. That kind of trial by battle and cleverness
between the three estates and the fourth hardly seems the way best to
further the various aims of a democratic society. It does not ensure
that what should be concealed will not be uncovered. And, on the other
hand, the rare, haphazard, fortuitous, journalistic uncovering will
hardly achieve effective public knowledge of all that should be known,
for almost all that is concealed (needfully or not) will continue to be
effectively withheld. (That some bits of it are sometimes selectively
revealed by official "leaks" to chosen journalists only underscores the
haphazard quality of what is disclosed.)
Nor does the implication that the courts will be available to adjust
the competing interests promise an effective accommodation. The diffi-
culty is not with judicial balancing in principle: that, we have accepted
(pace Mr. Justice Black), is what the Constitution orders even as
regards the "preferred freedoms" of the first amendment.17 But, one
may ask, can courts meaningfully weigh the Government's "need" to
27E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Even for Mr. Justice Black the first amend-




conceal, the Press's "need" to publish, the people's "need" to know?
If, on the one hand, the need for military secrecy in time of war seems
obvious and paramount; if, on the other hand, as in the Pentagon Papers
Case, many could not see why the Government should conceal docu-
ments several years old relating to an issue that had become of great
national moment; who can meaningfully weigh the less obvious, less
dramatic consequences of disclosure of any one of millions of documents
that are the stuff of governing and of international relations? How
does a court weigh the effect on relations with country X, or on inter-
national relations generally, of publication of a diplomatic communica-
tion to or from another country which the latter does not wish to see
public? How does the court weigh the people's "need" to know in any
particular case? Such considerations, no doubt, impelled Mr. justice
Harlan to say that the Court should ask only whether the subject
matter is within the general area of competence of the Executive Branch
and whether the Head of the Department certified that withholding was
necessary; 28 beyond that, whether a document or information should
be withheld was for political judgment and within the constitutional
authority of the Executive to determine. Especially with the direction
of the winds of change on the Supreme Court, the Court would doubtless
accept the Harlan formula if Congress enacted it, even to support an
injunction, surely for criminal penalties. That would largely safeguard
the needs of government, but it will only encourage unnecessary secrecy.
But public knowledge will not flourish even if the Court continues
to insist that the Constitution requires judicial review of the Govern-
ment's determination that national interest in concealment outweighs the
freedom of the Press to publish. Inevitably the courts will have to
legislate gross categories ("diplomatic correspondence," "internal
memoranda") and even then virtually rubber stamp (and legitimate)
governmental concealment. In the result, there will be few instances of
Press uncovering and divulging, few cases in which the Executive will
seek to bar or punish publication, few cases in which the Court will in
fact reverse the Executive.
Effectively, then, the issue will remain one between Executive and
Press. Many will support the claims of government, insisting that the
consequences of over-concealment are less grave than those of over-
disclosure; that the wisdom and integrity of government must be the
ultimate safeguard in this as in other, more important, decisions; that
it is "our government," more or less responsible to the people. Others,
increasingly distrustful of government, will see in the ever-present threat
of uncovering, even by a not-responsible, sometimes irresponsible press,
some, and the only, defense against governmental abuse.
There is no happy solution, only the eternal cry and quest for better
government. But surely Congress and the President could do more than
they have done. The Pentagon Papers Case has dramatized issues, ad-
28 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 757 (1971).
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monished bureaucrats, and created an atmosphere receptive to a major
effort to increase public and scholarly knowledge even while reinforcing
secrecy where it is necessary. There is need for measures to rebuild con-
fidence in government, including confidence in its policies of disclosure
and concealment. At least there ought to be provision for automatic
declassification of many categories of documents, putting the burden on
the bureaucracy to determine and maintain the need for reclassifying.
Until Congress and Presidents turn a hard face to unnecessary classi-
fication, 9 bureaucrats will not learn the habit of disclosure. The
unhappy game of trial by cleverness between Executive and Press with
an infrequent journalistic success will do little to support the people's
right to know when Government abuses its responsibility to withhold.
29 Both the President and the Congress have constitutional authority to regulate
disclosure, the President under his Executive power, U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1,
Congress under its power to establish additional offices "by law," id., art. II, § 2.
